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THE ROBERTS COURT AND FEDERALISM
"The Chief Justice on the Spot"
The New York Times
January 9, 2009
Linda Greenhouse
A case sitting quietly in the Supreme
Court's in-basket promises to tell us more
than almost any other about John G. Roberts
Jr. and his evolution from spear carrier in
the Reagan revolution to chief justice of the
United States-and in the process set the
direction of the debate over race and politics
for years to come.
The question is whether Congress acted
within its constitutional authority two years
ago when it extended a central provision of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for 25 years.
An appeal challenging the act's reauthorized
Section 5, a provision that requires certain
states and localities to receive federal
permission before making any change in
election procedures, awaits the justices when
they return today from a holiday recess.
On the surface, this case appears an unlikely
judicial bellwether. Extending the life of the
"preclearance" provision, considered one of
the civil rights movement's crowning
legislative accomplishments, is hardly novel.
This was the fourth extension, in fact, and
the second for a 25-year duration; the
Supreme Court, which upheld the original
Voting Rights Act in 1966, approved an
earlier extension of Section 5 in 1980.
Nor does the issue appear fueled by the
partisanship or ideological divisions that the
current Supreme Court so often mirrors. The
latest extension passed the Republican-
controlled Congress overwhelmingly in
2006. President Bush promptly signed it into
law, and a special panel of three federal
judges upheld it last May.
Given all that, what about this case makes it
a potentially defining moment for Chief
Justice Roberts?
To answer that question requires seeing the
appeal, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District No. I v. Mukasey, for the politically
charged case it really is. The seeming
unanimity that greeted the extension of
Section 5 in 2006 was a facade, masking
deep divisions over whether to continue
requiring all or parts of 16 states, most in the
South, to receive Justice Department or
federal court permission before moving a
polling place or changing a registration
deadline. Was a measure approved 40 years
ago as a remedy for the suppression of
minority votes still appropriate?
Many Republicans, most notably some
Southern senators, thought not. But they
allowed the extension to pass on the
assumption that the Supreme Court would
eventually answer the question, relieving
them of the political cost of dismantling an
iconic statute. Days after the extension
became law, the anticipated legal challenge
was filed by a well-connected Texas
Republican lawyer representing what is
surely one of the most obscure jurisdictions
to be covered by Section 5, a sewer district
that serves 3,500 residents of Travis County,
Tex.
The Republicans understood recent trends at
the court to be working in their favor, and
they may be right. The case serves up to the
court a fascinating brew of two of the most
freighted issues in constitutional law, race
and federalism-or, to put it another way,
individual rights and constitutional structure.
The Roberts court has yet to come to rest on
either, but this case will force it to do so:
Voting Rights Act cases have a special
provision that requires the Supreme Court to
decide them. The court can't do what it does
with 99 percent of the cases that reach it and
simply deny review without comment. The
chief justice will have to show his hand.
In cases dealing with race, he already has.
"It is a sordid business, this divvying us up
by race," he complained in a Texas
redistricting case in 2006. The next year, he
wrote an opinion rejecting a plan by which
the school system in Louisville, Ky., sought
to preserve the hard-won gains of integration
by assigning students to schools based on
race.
Because the Louisville schools had been
released seven years earlier from decades of
federal court supervision, the chief justice
said the district no longer had the
"compelling interest" that justified any use
of race to keep the schools integrated. It was
a position so extreme that Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, who is skeptical of all race-
conscious government policies and agreed
that the Louisville plan was unconstitutional,
refused to sign the opinion.
The federalism issue at the core of the new
case grows out of a series of cases from
1997 to 2003 in which the Rehnquist court
applied a new level of scrutiny to
Congressional action enforcing the
guarantees of the Reconstruction
amendments.
While previously Congress could do almost
anything in the name of protecting
individual rights, the new doctrine requires
it to demonstrate a "congruence and
proportionality" between violation and
remedy. The appeal now before the court
argues that the extension fails that test, given
"the utter absence of any present-day pattern
of unconstitutional voting-rights
deprivations of the type Section 5 was
originally designed to address." The
measure's defenders argue in response that
because the law serves to deter just such
violations, the Texas sewer district is trying
to blame Section 5 for its own success.
The Roberts court has not resumed the
Rehnquist court's federalism battles, and the
chief justice's own views are unclear. But he
does not come as a novice to the debate over
the Voting Rights Act. As a young lawyer in
the Reagan Justice Department, he wrote
sharply worded memos on behalf of the
administration's failed effort to block
expansion of the act in 1982. Confronted
with his paper trail during his Supreme
Court confirmation hearing in 2005, he
explained that he was simply expressing the
administration's views.
Perhaps. But equally telling may be words
written by his predecessor as chief justice.
William H. Rehnquist, then an associate
justice, dissented from a decision that
upheld an earlier extension of Section 5. The
law "requires state and local governments to
cede far more of their powers to the federal
government than the Civil War amendments
ever envisioned," Rehnquist wrote in April
1980. Months later, the 25-year-old John
Roberts arrived at his chambers as a law
clerk. A 25-year relationship as mentor and
protege ended only with Rehnquist's death
days before his former law clerk was named
to succeed him.
The new case, in other words, arrives at the
intersection of John Roberts's past and the
Supreme Court's future.
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"Extended Civil Commitment of
Sex Offenders Is Upheld"
The New York Times
May 18, 2010
Adam Liptak
In a broad endorsement of federal power, the
Supreme Court on Monday ruled that
Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to allow the continued civil
commitment of sex offenders after they have
completed their criminal sentences.
The 7-to-2 decision touched off a heated
debate among the justices on a question that
has lately engaged the Tea Party movement
and opponents of the new health care law:
What limits does the Constitution impose on
Congress's power to legislate on matters not
specifically delegated to it in Article I?
The federal law at issue in the case allows
the government to continue to detain
prisoners who had engaged in sexually
violent conduct, suffered from mental illness
and would have difficulty controlling
themselves. If the government is able to
prove all of this to a judge by "clear and
convincing" evidence-a heightened
standard, but short of "beyond a reasonable
doubt"-it may hold such prisoners until
they are no longer dangerous or a state
assumes responsibility for them.
The challenge to the civil commitment law
was brought by five prisoners. The case of
Graydon Comstock was typical. In
November 2006, six days before Mr.
Comstock was to have completed a 37-
month sentence for receiving child
pornography, Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales certified that Mr. Comstock was a
sexually dangerous person.
Last year, a three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in Richmond, Va., unanimously
ruled that none of the powers granted to
Congress in the Constitution empowered it
to authorize such civil commitments. But the
decision was stayed, and Mr. Comstock has
remained confined in a federal prison.
At the argument of the case in January,
Solicitor General Elena Kagan, now
President Obama's pick for the Supreme
Court, said the law was needed "to run a
criminal justice system that does not itself
endanger the public." She said 105 people
had been confined under the law.
Ms. Kagan pointed to the Constitution's
"necessary and proper" clause as granting
Congress the power to pass the law, though
the clause is not ordinarily thought of as a
source of free-standing authority. The clause
gives Congress the right "to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution" its other powers.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for
himself and four other justices, said the
clause provided Congress with the needed
authority as long as the statute in question
was "rationally related to the
implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power."
Congress has the undoubted powers, Justice
Breyer said, to enact criminal laws in
furtherance of its enumerated powers and to
create a prison system to punish people who
violate those laws, though neither power is
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.
"The civil commitment statute before us
represents a modest addition," he added,
comparing it to medical quarantine.
Justice Breyer took pains to make clear that
the court was not ruling on the separate
question of whether such confinement
violated the Constitution's due process
clause.
Two justices, Samuel A. Alito Jr. and
Anthony M. Kennedy, voted to uphold the
law but did not adopt Justice Breyer's
general approach.
In his concurrence, Justice Alito said he was
concerned about both "the breadth of the
court's language" and "the ambiguity of the
standard that the court applies."
But he said the civil confinement law passed
constitutional muster. "Just as it is necessary
and proper for Congress to provide for the
apprehension of escaped federal prisoners,"
he wrote, "it is necessary and proper for
Congress to provide for the civil
commitment of dangerous federal prisoners
who would otherwise escape civil
commitment as a result of federal
imprisonment."
"This is not a case in which it is merely
possible for a court to think of a rational
basis on which Congress might have
perceived an attenuated link between the
powers underlying the federal criminal
statutes and the challenged federal criminal
provision," Justice Alito added, saying there
was in this case at least "a substantial link."
Justice Kennedy added that the majority did
not pay enough heed to the 10th
Amendment. Under the amendment, he
wrote, "the Constitution delegates limited
powers to the national government and then
reserves the remainder for the states (or the
people), not the other way around, as the
court's analysis suggests."
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice
Antonin Scalia, dissented in the case, United
States v. Comstock, No. 08-1224.
"The fact that the federal government has
the authority to imprison a person for the
purpose of punishing him for a federal
crime-sex-related or otherwise-does not
provide the government with the additional
power to exercise indefinite civil control
over that person," Justice Thomas wrote.
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"Bad News for Federalism? Some Preliminary
Reflections on Comstock"
The Volokh Conspiracy
May 17, 2010
Ilya Somin
I tend to agree with Eugene that today's
Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Comstock is very bad news for constitutional
federalism. However, the ultimate import of
the decision is hard to gauge because the
majority opinion is ambiguous on at least
one crucial point: whether Necessary Proper
Clause cases are governed exclusively by
the ultradeferential "rational basis" test, or
whether courts should also weigh the
presence or absence of five other factors the
Court relied on in upholding the statute
under which Comstock was detained.
I. The "Rational Basis" Test.
The big problem is not just that the Court
ruled that Congress had the power to detain
"sexually dangerous" federal prisoners who
have already completed their sentences. By
itself, this is a relatively minor policy
(except, of course, for the people detained).
The really dangerous element of the
majority opinion is that it adopts the highly
deferential "rational basis" test for assessing
assertions of power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, holding that "in determining
whether the Necessary and Proper Clause
grants Congress the legislative authority to
enact a particular federal statute, we look to
see whether the statute constitutes a means
that is rationally related to the
implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power."
As Justice Kennedy points out in his
concurring opinion (where he rejects this
part of the Court's holding), this highly
deferential approach is extremely
problematic:
The terms "rationally related" and "rational
basis" must be employed with care,
particularly if either is to be used as a stand-
alone test. The phrase "rational basis" most
often is employed to describe the standard
for determining whether legislation that does
not proscribe fundamental liberties
nonetheless violates the Due Process Clause.
Referring to this due process inquiry, and in
what must be one of the most deferential
formulations of the standard for reviewing
legislation in all the Court's precedents, the
Court has said: "But the law need not be in
every respect logically consistent with its
aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and
that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it." Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 487-488 (1955).
This formulation was in a case presenting a
due process challenge and a challenge to a
State's exercise of its own powers, powers
not confined by the principles that control
the limited nature of our National
Government. The phrase, then, should not
be extended uncritically to the issue before
US.
II. Is the Real Standard Actually a Five
Factor Test?
There is one aspect of the majority's
reasoning that may give hope to advocates
of judicial enforcement of federalism. Near
the end of the Court's opinion, Justice
Breyer lists five factors that determined the
outcome:
We take these five considerations
together. They include: (1) the
breadth of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, (2) the long history of
federal involvement in this arena, (3)
the sound reasons for the statute's
enactment in light of the
Government's custodial interest in
safeguarding the public from dangers
posed by those in federal custody,
(4) the statute's accommodation of
state interests, and (5) the statute's
narrow scope. Taken together, these
considerations lead us to conclude
that the statute is a "necessary and
proper" means of exercising the
federal authority that permits
Congress to create federal criminal
laws, to punish their violation, to
imprison violators, to provide
appropriately for those imprisoned,
and to maintain the security of those
who are not imprisoned but who may
be affected by the federal
imprisonment of others.
This immediately raises the question of what
happens in a case where one or more of
these considerations cuts the other way. Like
Randy Barnett, I particularly have in mind
the Obamacare individual health care
mandate, which is certainly not "narrow in
scope" (it forces millions of people to buy a
product they may not want), does not
"accommodate state interests" to the extent
the Court claims the Comstock legislation
does, and may lack a comparable "long
history of federal involvement" (the federal
government has often regulated health care,
but never by forcing individuals to purchase
products).
The ultimate impact of Comstock will
depend on whether the key holding is the
imposition of the rational basis test (which
could potentially be used to uphold almost
anything), or whether it is the five factor test
quoted above, which is much less definitive.
Only five justices signed on to the majority
opinion; Justices Alito and Kennedy
concurred on narrow grounds and made
clear that they reject the rational basis test. If
even one of the five decides that the
multifactor test is the true operative standard
(most likely Chief Justice Roberts),
Comstock might turn out to be less
dangerous that it initially seems.
III. My View of the Merits.
I think the Court got this one badly wrong,
and that the challenged statute should have
been invalidated. I explained my reasoning
in this post, where I commented on the oral
argument:
[Solicitor General Elena] Kagan fails to link
the confinement of these individuals to any
other enumerated power of the federal
government. She tries to link it instead to
"the Federal power to operate a criminal
justice system." However, there is no
separate enumerated power to operate a
criminal justice system. Rather, Congress is
only able to operate such a system in so far
as it is necessary to implement one of its
other powers (e.g.-to enforce punishments
to deter people from violating federal laws
that enforce one of those other powers). The
power to incarcerate "sexually dangerous"
inmates who have completed their sentences
does nothing to assist in the enforcement of
federal laws that are actually authorized by
any of Congress' enumerated powers....
Essentially, the government's argument rests
on the assertion that Congress has the power
to engage in any "beneficial" activity that is
in some way connected to something it can
do under its enumerated powers, even if that
"beneficial" activity does nothing to
facilitate the actual implementation of those
powers. Pretty much anything Congress
might want to do could be justified on those
grounds. As Comstock's lawyer put it in his
part of the oral argument, "the government's
argument essentially collapses into the
notion, well, if it's a good idea, it must be
necessary and proper to do it." If the Court
accepts this reasoning, it would turn the
Necessary and Proper Clause into a free-
floating grant of unlimited power.
The above passage criticizes Solicitor
General Elena Kagan's arguments for the
government. But it applies also to the
Court's opinion, which similarly tries to link
the statute to Congress' authority to operate
a criminal justice and penal system.
I also agree with most of the strong critique
of the majority opinion in Justice Thomas'
dissent (joined by Justice Scalia). Scalia's
support for Thomas' position in this case
suggests that he may be having second
thoughts about the very broad view of the
Necessary and Proper Clause that he
embraced in Gonzales v. Raich. It's also
worth noting that the dissent extensively
cites co-blogger Randy Barnett's excellent
article "The Original Meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause."
Overall, I think this is a very unfortunate
decision, particularly in so far as Chief
Justice Roberts endorsed the majority
opinion. I am probably less optimistic than
Randy Barnett. At the same time, there is a
crucial ambiguity in the Court's reasoning
that might reduce the decision's future
impact. And the coalition between Roberts
and the four liberals might prove to be more
fragile than it currently seems.
HEALTH CARE
"Supreme Court May Weigh
Coverage Mandate"
The Associated Press
March 29, 2010
Kara Roland
The same Supreme Court justices whom
President Obama blasted during his State of
the Union address this year may ultimately
decide the fate of his crowning achievement
as more than a dozen states have called on
the courts to strike down the health
insurance mandate of Democrats' health
care overhaul-a move that would threaten
the entire law.
Two major constitutional challenges have
been levied against the new law, one by the
state of Virginia, which enacted a law
exempting its citizens from the federal
health insurance mandate, and another by
Florida and 12 other states. Legal scholars
are divided on the merits of the cases, and
even Congress-through its research service
and its budget scorekeeper-has said it's an
open question whether the provision could
pass constitutional muster.
At issue is the scope of the federal
government's power over states and
individuals. Critics of the law say the
requirement that all Americans buy
insurance or pay a fine, if allowed, would
mean that Congress has virtually boundless
authority to compel actions. Proponents
argue that legal precedents support an
expansive reading of the legislative branch's
license to regulate such activity.
"This is one of the most consequential
lawsuits in our generation," said Baker
Hostetler lawyer David B. Rivkin Jr., who is
serving as outside counsel to the 13 states
that have filed suit. "The fact you have so
many different state attorneys general,
Republicans and Democrats, from a variety
of states coming together to do this just
underscores how strongly they feel that the
act infringes core constitutional interests of
their respective states."
The mandate, which doesn't take effect until
2014, is central to Democrats' goal of
insuring about 32 million more Americans.
The law would offer tax credits to low-
income individuals and allow young adults
to remain on their parents' policies longer.
Both of the state lawsuits challenge the
federal government's authority under the
Commerce Clause, which grants Congress
the power to regulate commerce among the
states. The Florida case also cites a violation
of the 10th Amendment, which reserves
those powers not spelled out under the
federal government in the Constitution to the
state governments, and argues that the health
care law's expansion of state Medicaid
programs threatens state sovereignty.
Among the arguments against the law is that
because it does not allow for purchasing
insurance across state lines-the insurance
exchanges are state-based-the buying of
health insurance does not constitute
interstate commerce. In addition, the
plaintiffs say, not purchasing health
insurance does not constitute an economic
activity.
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"Thus far in our history, it has never been
held that the Commerce Clause, even when
aided by the Necessary and Proper Clause,
can be used to require citizens to buy goods
or services," Virginia Attorney General
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II argues in his state's
lawsuit. "To depart from that history to
permit the national government to require
the purchase of goods or services would...
create powers indistinguishable from a
general police power in total derogation of
our constitutional scheme of enumerated
powers."
While a requirement to buy health insurance
might be new, some legal analysts say,
Congress can in fact define an economic
activity as something that results from not
taking an action.
"The 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits hotels
and restaurants from discriminating based
on race and thus prohibits inactivity," said
Erwin Chemerinsky, dean of the University
of California Irvine School of Law, noting
that law relied upon the Commerce Clause.
"The Supreme Court has said that Congress
can regulate economic activity that has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Buying or refusing to buy insurance is
economic activity. The effect on the
economy is enormous."
As an example, Mr. Chemerinsky cited
cases in which the high court upheld
Congress' authority to regulate the amount
of wheat that farmers grow for their own
home consumption or prohibit the
cultivation of marijuana for medicinal
purposes.
"If that fits within the commerce power,
surely the health industry does," he said.
Mr. Rivkin, who served in various legal
capacities for the Reagan administration and
the George H.W. Bush administration,
strongly disagreed. If that were the case, he
argued, there would be no limits to the
government's power as the Founding
Fathers intended. He said the cases cited by
Mr. Chemerinsky involve the cultivating of
commodities and therefore clearly economic
activities, unlike the refusal to purchase
health insurance.
"The remarkable thing about an individual
insurance purchase mandate is you are not
being subject to a requirement by virtue of
any economic activity you engage in-
you're not doing a damn thing; you just
exist," he said. "If this is upheld, then the
federal government can do everything it
wants subject only to the restrictions
contained in the Bill of Rights."
Democratic leaders and the White House
have scoffed at the legal challenges. Last
week, press secretary Robert Gibbs said
administration attorneys advised him "we'll
win these lawsuits."
Jack M. Balkin, a professor at Yale Law
School, noted that the new law structures the
mandate as an amendment to the tax code
and includes a discussion of the impact on
state commerce, suggesting that the
administration will defend it by citing the
Commerce Clause as well as Congress'
power to tax under the "general welfare"
provision. That provision says the federal
government may impose taxes-in this case,
the penalty for those who don't buy
insurance would be the tax-in order to
provide for the "general welfare" of the
country.
Not everyone agrees with that reasoning.
"It is a taxation and spending power, not an
open-ended general welfare clause," said
Michael W. McConnell, a Stanford law
professor and former circuit court judge
appointed by President George W. Bush.
"And by the way, 'general' had a very
specific meaning in the late 18th century-it
meant nationwide in scope, which is why
some of the state-specific provisions are
constitutionally dubious."
Both lawsuits are in federal district courts,
but analysts expect the issue to end up
before the Supreme Court. If the high court
were to rule in favor of the plaintiffs, the
ramifications for Congress could be
sweeping.
"It would be difficult for the court to hold
that the law is outside of the power to tax
and spend for the general welfare without
calling into question various regulatory
devices that both parties use in crafting
legislation," Mr. Balkin said. "Since the
New Deal, both parties have used the taxing
and spending power for a wide range of
regulatory purposes and this is what the
challenge to the health care bill calls into
question."
However, the justices have not been averse
to striking down congressional laws favored
by Mr. Obama. The president used his State
of the Union address to attack, with the
justices present, a decision that struck down
limits on corporate and union spending for
political campaigns on First Amendment
grounds.
In his speech, Mr. Obama warned of foreign
influence over U.S. elections while Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr. silently mouthed that
Mr. Obama was not telling the truth. Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr., in response to a
questioner at a speech some weeks later,
called the president's words "very
troubling."
"Health Care Law's Enemies Have
No Ally in Constitution"
The Boston Globe
May 21, 2010
Charles Fried
A recent 7-2 Supreme Court decision
affirming the constitutional power of
Congress to allow the indefinite detention of
sexually dangerous child pomographers
after the end of their federal sentences has
the surprising effect of showing just how
far-fetched are the constitutional objections
to the new health care legislation.
One objection holds that the Constitution's
clauses giving Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce do not give
Congress the power to impose a modest
penalty (up to about $700) on people who
could-but do not-buy health insurance.
To see why this is a bad argument, consider
the steps by which the Court held that
Congress has the power to keep sexually
dangerous child pornographers in
confinement: The Constitution explicitly
gives Congress the power to regulate
interstate commerce. And it has long been
the law that Congress can forbid commerce
in things that might be harmful. Those who
traffic (or possess, in the case of child
pornography) such things can be prosecuted
and imprisoned.
The recent Supreme Court ruling, United
States v. Comstock, added that the power to
imprison implies an obligation to protect the
public from dangerous people even after
they had served their sentences. There can
be no doubt that insurance, and particularly
health insurance, is commerce with
interstate effects that Congress may regulate.
For the health regulation to work, though, it
is "necessary and proper"--the clause
explicitly in play in Comstock-to nudge
(with the $700 penalty) the young and
healthy to enter the insurance pool, and not
to wait until they are old and infirm.
Insurance just won't work if you could wait
until your house is on fire to buy it. But, say
the objectors, this is not penalizing someone
for doing something harmful; it's penalizing
him for not doing something, and that's
somehow different.
It is not. Congress has the power to enact the
regulatory scheme and to design it in a way
that is "necessary and proper" to its good
functioning, and that means sweeping in the
unwilling. But even granting Congress's
power under the commerce and "necessary
and proper" clauses, is it not an offense to
constitutional liberty to impose the $700
penalty? Is the mandate not independently
constitutionally "improper"?
That objection would complain that such a
mandate violates some constitutional liberty
even if enacted by a state (as Massachusetts
has done). Here again, Comstock is
instructive. The convicted child
pornographer claimed that he was deprived
of his constitutional liberty by continued
detention after he had served his sentence,
but the Supreme Court had decided many
years ago that Kansas could, with proper
procedural safeguards, do just that. And if it
violated no liberty for Kansas to do it, then
neither did it violate any liberty for
Congress to do it.
A more telling precedent is the Supreme
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Court's 1905 decision in Jacobson v.
Commonwealth, which rejected a complaint
against Massachusetts's compulsory
vaccination law that it said infringed the
"inherent right of every freeman to care for
his own body and health in such way as
seems to him best."
Whatever Jacobson's right to care for
himself, he had none to impose risks on his
fellow citizens. A healthy, young person
who persists in staying out of the insurance
pools imposes a burden on his fellow
citizens also.
Finally there is the bogus complaint that the
federal law unconstitutionally imposes
financial and administrative burdens on
unwilling states. The statute exempts
unwilling states from participating,
subjecting the citizens of those states to the
federal scheme directly. There are sensible
reasons for opposing the new federal health
care system-for instance, it will add to the
federal deficit and fail to control health care
costs-but the Constitution is not one of
them.
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"Changing Stance, Administration Now Defends
Insurance Mandate as a Tax"
The New York Times
July 16, 2010
Robert Pear
When Congress required most Americans to
obtain health insurance or pay a penalty,
Democrats denied that they were creating a
new tax. But in court, the Obama
administration and its allies now defend the
requirement as an exercise of the
government's "power to lay and collect
taxes."
And that power, they say, is even more
sweeping than the federal power to regulate
interstate commerce.
Administration officials say the tax
argument is a linchpin of their legal case in
defense of the health care overhaul and its
individual mandate, now being challenged in
court by more than 20 states and several
private organizations.
Under the legislation signed by President
Obama in March, most Americans will have
to maintain "minimum essential coverage"
starting in 2014. Many people will be
eligible for federal subsidies to help them
pay premiums.
In a brief defending the law, the Justice
Department says the requirement for people
to carry insurance or pay the penalty is "a
valid exercise" of Congress's power to
impose taxes.
Congress can use its taxing power "even for
purposes that would exceed its powers under
other provisions" of the Constitution, the
department said. For more than a century, it
added, the Supreme Court has held that
Congress can tax activities that it could not
reach by using its power to regulate
commerce.
While Congress was working on the health
care legislation, Mr. Obama refused to
accept the argument that a mandate to buy
insurance, enforced by financial penalties,
was equivalent to a tax.
"For us to say that you've got to take a
responsibility to get health insurance is
absolutely not a tax increase," the president
said last September, in a spirited exchange
with George Stephanopoulos on the ABC
News program "This Week."
When Mr. Stephanopoulos said the penalty
appeared to fit the dictionary definition of a
tax, Mr. Obama replied, "I absolutely reject
that notion."
Congress anticipated a constitutional
challenge to the individual mandate.
Accordingly, the law includes 10 detailed
findings meant to show that the mandate
regulates commercial activity important to
the nation's economy. Nowhere does
Congress cite its taxing power as a source of
authority.
Under the Constitution, Congress can
exercise its taxing power to provide for the
"general welfare." It is for Congress, not
courts, to decide which taxes are "conducive
to the general welfare," the Supreme Court
said 73 years ago in upholding the Social
Security Act.
Dan Pfeiffer, the White House
communications director, described the tax
power as an alternative source of authority.
"The Commerce Clause supplies sufficient
authority for the shared-responsibility
requirements in the new health reform law,"
Mr. Pfeiffer said. "To the extent that there is
any question of additional authority-and
we don't believe there is-it would be
available through the General Welfare
Clause."
The law describes the levy on the uninsured
as a "penalty" rather than a tax. The Justice
Department brushes aside the distinction,
saying "the statutory label" does not matter.
The constitutionality of a tax law depends
on "its practical operation," not the precise
form of words used to describe it, the
department says, citing a long line of
Supreme Court cases.
Moreover, the department says the penalty is
a tax because it will raise substantial
revenue: $4 billion a year by 2017,
according to the Congressional Budget
Office.
In addition, the department notes, the
penalty is imposed and collected under the
Internal Revenue Code, and people must
report it on their tax returns "as an addition
to income tax liability."
Because the penalty is a tax, the department
says, no one can challenge it in court before
paying it and seeking a refund.
Jack M. Balkin, a professor at Yale Law
School who supports the new law, said,
"The tax argument is the strongest argument
for upholding" the individual-coverage
requirement.
Mr. Obama "has not been honest with the
American people about the nature of this
bill," Mr. Balkin said last month at a
meeting of the American Constitution
Society, a progressive legal organization.
"This bill is a tax. Because it's a tax, it's
completely constitutional."
Mr. Balkin and other law professors pressed
that argument in a friend-of-the-court brief
filed in one of the pending cases.
Opponents contend that the "minimum
coverage provision" is unconstitutional
because it exceeds Congress's power to
regulate commerce.
"This is the first time that Congress has ever
ordered Americans to use their own money
to purchase a particular good or service,"
said Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Republican of
Utah.
In their lawsuit, Florida and other states say:
"Congress is attempting to regulate and
penalize Americans for choosing not to
engage in economic activity. If Congress
can do this much, there will be virtually no
sphere of private decision-making beyond
the reach of federal power."
In reply, the administration and its allies say
that a person who goes without insurance is
simply choosing to pay for health care out of
pocket at a later date. In the aggregate, they
say, these decisions have a substantial effect
on the interstate market for health care and
health insurance.
In its legal briefs, the Obama administration
points to a famous New Deal case, Wickard
v. Filburn, in which the Supreme Court
upheld a penalty imposed on an Ohio farmer
who had grown a small amount of wheat, in
excess of his production quota, purely for
his own use.
The wheat grown by Roscoe Filburn "may
be trivial by itself," the court said, but when
combined with the output of other small
farmers, it significantly affected interstate
commerce and could therefore be regulated
by the government as part of a broad scheme
regulating interstate commerce.
"The Insurance Mandate in Peril"
The Wall Street Journal
April 29, 2010
Randy E. Barnett
A"tell" in poker is a subtle but detectable
change in a player's behavior or demeanor
that reveals clues about the player's
assessment of his hand. Something similar
has happened with regard to the insurance
mandate at the core of last month's health
reform legislation. Congress justified its
authority to enact the mandate on the
grounds that it is a regulation of commerce.
But as this justification came under heavy
constitutional fire, the mandate's defenders
changed the argument-now claiming
constitutional authority under Congress's
power to tax.
This switch in constitutional theories is a
tell: Defenders of the bill lack confidence in
their commerce power theory. The switch
also comes too late. When the mandate's
constitutionality comes up for review as part
of the state attorneys general lawsuit, the
Supreme Court will not consider the penalty
enforcing the mandate to be a tax because,
in the provision that actually defines and
imposes the mandate and penalty, Congress
did not call it a tax and did not treat it as a
tax.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (aka ObamaCare) includes what it calls
an "individual responsibility requirement"
that all persons buy health insurance from a
private company. Congress justified this
mandate under its power to regulate
commerce among the several states: "The
individual responsibility requirement
provided for in this section," the law says, "
. . is commercial and economic in nature,
and substantially affects interstate
commerce, as a result of the effects
described in paragraph (2)." Paragraph (2)
then begins: "The requirement regulates
activity that is commercial and economic in
nature: economic and financial decisions
about how and when health care is paid for,
and when health insurance is purchased."
In this way, the statute speciously tries to
convert inactivity into the "activity" of
making a "decision." By this reasoning, your
"decision" not to take a job, not to sell your
house, or not to buy a Chevrolet is an
"activity that is commercial and economic in
nature" that can be mandated by Congress.
It is true that the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Commerce Clause broadly
enough to reach wholly intrastate economic
"activity" that substantially affects interstate
commerce. But the Court has never upheld a
requirement that individuals who are doing
nothing must engage in economic activity by
entering into a contractual relationship with
a private company. Such a claim of power is
literally unprecedented.
Since this Commerce Clause language was
first proposed in the Senate last December,
Democratic legislators and law professors
alike breezily dismissed any constitutional
objections as preposterous. After the bill
was enacted, critics branded lawsuits by
state attorneys general challenging the
insurance mandate as frivolous. Yet, unable
to produce a single example of Congress
using its commerce power this way, the
defenders of the personal mandate began to
shift grounds.
On March 21, the same day the House
approved the Senate version of the
legislation, the staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation released a 157-page "technical
explanation" of the bill. The word
"commerce" appeared nowhere. Instead, the
personal mandate is dubbed an "Excise Tax
on Individuals Without Essential Health
Benefits Coverage." But while the enacted
bill does impose excise taxes on "high cost,"
employer-sponsored insurance plans and
"indoor tanning services," the statute never
describes the regulatory "penalty" it imposes
for violating the mandate as an "excise tax."
It is expressly called a "penalty."
This shift won't work. The Supreme Court
will not allow staffers and lawyers to change
the statutory cards that Congress already
dealt when it adopted the Senate language.
In the 1920s, when Congress wanted to
prohibit activity that was then deemed to be
solely within the police power of states, it
tried to penalize the activity using its tax
power. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture (1922)
the Supreme Court struck down such a
penalty saying, "there comes a time in the
extension of the penalizing features of the
so-called tax when it loses its character as
such and becomes a mere penalty with the
characteristics of regulation and
punishment."
Although the Court has never repudiated this
principle, the Court now interprets the
commerce power far more broadly. Thus
Congress may regulate or prohibit intrastate
economic activity directly without invoking
its taxation power. Yet precisely because a
mandate to engage in economic activity has
never been upheld by the Court, the tax
power is once again being used to escape
constitutional limits on Congress's
regulatory power.
Supporters of the mandate cite U.S. v.
Kahriger (1953), where the Court upheld a
punitive tax on gambling by saying that
"[u]nless there are provisions extraneous to
any tax need, courts are without authority to
limit the exercise of the taxing power." Yet
the Court in Kahriger also cited Bailey with
approval. The key to understanding
Kahriger is the proposition the Court there
rejected: "it is said that Congress, under the
pretense of exercising its power to tax has
attempted to penalize illegal intrastate
gambling through the regulatory features of
the Act."
In other words, the Court in Kahriger
declined to look behind Congress's assertion
that it was exercising its tax power to see
whether a measure was really a regulatory
penalty. As the Court said in Sonzinsky v.
U.S. (1937), "[i]nquiry into the hidden
motives which may move Congress to
exercise a power constitutionally conferred
upon it is beyond the competency of courts."
But this principle cuts both ways. Neither
will the Court look behind Congress's
inadequate assertion of its commerce power
to speculate as to whether a measure was
"really" a tax. The Court will read the cards
as Congress dealt them.
Congress simply did not enact the personal
insurance mandate pursuant to its tax
powers. To the contrary, the statute
expressly says the mandate "regulates
activity that is commercial and economic in
nature." It never mentions the tax power and
none of its eight findings mention raising
any revenue with the penalty.
Moreover, while inserting the mandate into
the Internal Revenue Code, Congress then
expressly severed the penalty from the
normal enforcement mechanisms of the tax
code. The failure to pay the penalty "shall
not be subject to any criminal prosecution or
penalty with respect to such failure." Nor
shall the IRS "file notice of lien with respect
to any property of a taxpayer by reason of
any failure to pay the penalty imposed by
this section," or "levy on any such property
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with respect to such failure."
In short, the "penalty" is explicitly justified
as a penalty to enforce a regulation of
economic activity and not as a tax. There is
no authority for the Court to recharacterize a
regulation as a tax when doing so is contrary
to the express and actual regulatory purpose
of Congress.
So defenders of the mandate are making yet
another unprecedented claim. Never before
has the Court looked behind Congress's
unconstitutional assertion of its commerce
power to see if a measure could have been
justified as a tax. For that matter, never
before has a "tax" penalty been used to
mandate, rather than discourage or prohibit,
Are there now five justices willing to
expand the commerce and tax powers of
Congress where they have never gone
before? Will the Court empower Congress to
mandate any activity on the theory that a
"decision" not to act somehow affects
interstate commerce? Will the Court accept
that Congress has the power to mandate any
activity so long as it is included in the
Internal Revenue Code and the IRS does the
enforcing?
Yes, the smart money is always on the Court
upholding an act of Congress. But given the
hand Congress is now holding, I would not
bet the farm.
economic activity.
"A Tax Like Any Other"
The New York Times
March 28, 2009
Jack Balkin
The individual mandate, which amends the
Internal Revenue Code, is not actually a
mandate at all. It is a tax. It gives people a
choice: they can buy health insurance or
they can pay a tax roughly equal to the cost
of health insurance, which is used to
subsidize the government's health care
program and families who wish to purchase
health insurance.
What the opponents are really claiming is
that it is unconstitutional to make Americans
pay taxes.
People are exempt from the tax if they get
health insurance through their employer or
through Medicare, are poor, are dependents,
are in the military, live overseas, or have a
religious objection.
The new law keeps insurance companies
from denying coverage because of
preexisting conditions or from imposing
lifetime caps on coverage. The individual
mandate makes these popular aspects of
health care reform possible.
Without an individual mandate people will
wait until they become sick to buy health
insurance, raising insurance premiums for
others and undermining the ability to spread
risk that is necessary for private insurance
markets. Requiring people to make a choice
between buying health insurance or paying a
tax gives people incentives to act
responsibly and not attempt to game the
system.
The Constitution gives Congress the power
to tax and spend money for the general
welfare. This tax promotes the general
welfare because it makes health care more
widely available and affordable. Under
existing law, therefore, the tax is clearly
constitutional.
The mandate is also not a "direct" tax which
must be apportioned among the states by
population. Direct taxes are taxes on land or
"head" taxes on the general population. The
individual mandate does not tax land. It is
not assessed on the population generally but
only on people who don't buy insurance and
aren't otherwise exempt. It is a tax on
behavior, like a tax on businesses that don't
install anti-pollution equipment.
Many important and popular government
programs are based Congress's ability to
give incentives through taxation and
redistribute tax revenues for public
purposes. To strike down the individual
mandate the Supreme Court would have to
undermine many years of precedents
justifying these programs that stretch back to
the New Deal (and in the case of the rules
for direct taxes, to the very founding of the
country).
Opponents of the individual mandate insist
that they are only defending individual
freedom, but they are actually taking a far
more radical position. They are really
claiming that it is unconstitutional to make
Americans pay taxes. The Supreme Court,
however, will not be fooled, and they will
reject this challenge.
"Doubts on New Health Law:
State's Challenge Goes Ahead"
SCOTUSblog
August 2, 2010
Lyle Denniston
Raising serious questions about the
constitutionality of a key part of President
Obama"s new health care reform plan, and
finding no Supreme Court decisions
specifically on the issue, a federal judge on
Monday ruled that the state of Virginia's
court challenge to the plan may go forward.
U.S. District Judge Henry E. Hudson of
Richmond, VA, rejected the
Administration's plea to dismiss that case at
the outset....
The new law, the judge commented,
"radically changes" health care coverage in
the country. In passing it, he added,
Congress broke new ground and extended
"Commerce Clause powers beyond its
current high watermark." Both sides, the
decision said, have turned up prior rulings,
but they are "short of definitive."
"While this case raises a host of complex
constitutional issues," the judge wrote, "all
seem to distill to the single question of
whether or not Congress has the power to
regulate-and tax-a citizen's decison not
to participate in interstate comerce"-that
is, a private decision not to buy health
insurance. "Neither the U.S. Supreme Court
nor any circuit court of appeals has squarely
addressed this issue ... Given the presence
of some authority arguably supporting the
theory underlying each side's position, this
Court cannot conclude at this stage that the
[Virginia] complaint fails to state a cause of
action. . . . Resolution of the controlling
issues in this case must await a hearing on
the merits."
The Virginia lawsuit is one of at least three
major cases challenging the new Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, one of
the President's main domestic policy
initiatives. Virginia's challenge was aimed
only at a provision that requires individuals
either to obtain a minimum level of health
insurance coverage or pay a penalty if they
do not do so. The law has two separate
provision on that point: the mandate to buy
health insurance, and the penalty for failure
to do that. Virginia challenged only the
mandate.
The state's complaint made two basic
constitutional arguments: first, that Congress
does not have the authority, under the
Commerce Clause, to require an unwilling
private person to buy something from a
private source, and, second, that, since there
was no constitutional basis for Congress to
pass the mandate, the law cannot be upheld
as a valid use of Congress' authority to put a
tax on that individual, under the
Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause.
As an alternative, the state contended that its
rights as a sovereign state under the
Constitution's Tenth Amendment are
violated by the new federal mandate,
because it conflicts directly with a new
Virginia law-passed explicitly to set up
such a test case-that protects the citizens of
Virginia from any such federal health
mandate.
Judge Hudson is the first federal judge, at
any level, to rule on any of the constitutional
arguments now being aimed at the new
federal program. While he did not resolve
finally any of the issues, he found enough
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strength behind the state's arguments that
defeated the Administration plea to dismiss
the case.
The Justice Department had contended that
the state's Attorney General could not
pursue the case at all, on the theory that a
state cannot sue the federal government in a
test over the powers each has over the state's
citizens. The Department also argued that
the lawsuit was premature, because the new
buy-insurance mandate does not take effect
until four years from now. Moreover, it
asserted that the state is barred by federal
law from seeking a court order against
enforcing a federal tax.
On the constitutional issues, the Department
argued that Congress had the authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate an
individual's activity that has an effect on
commerce among the states, and that the tax
or penalty to enforce that mandate was a
valid action under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
Judge Hudson found that the state Attorney
General did have a legal right to file the
case, in order to defend Virginia's own law
protecting its citizens from such a health
mandate. While the lawsuit might help
protect Virginia's citizens, the judge
concluded, its main aim is to defend the
state's sovereign interest in passing and
enforcing its own laws, duly enacted by its
legislature.
The judge went on to conclude that the
lawsuit was not premature, because the state
must soon begin to take steps to comply
with the federal mandate. The state, among
other actions, would have to revamp its own
health care program, specifically the
Medicaid program of providing-with
federal financial support-health care for
the poor. The judge commented:
"Unquestionably, this regulation radically
changes the landscape of health insurance
coverage in America."
On the constitutional arguments, the judge
said the task was simply to decide whether
Virginia had outlined a case that was
"legally viable." He found that Virginia had
done so, although he did not rule finally on
any dispute in the case except the state's
legal right to bring the case to court.
The judge outlined both sides' arguments on
the Commerce Clause issue, and commented
that that part of the case "raises issues of
national significance." The two sides, he
added, have taken "widely divergent and at
times novel" positions on those issues.
Displaying some skepticism about the scope
of the new mandate, Hudson said that "never
before has the Commerce Clause and
associated Necessary and Proper Clause
been extended this far. At this juncture, the
Court is not persuaded that [the
Administration] has demonstrated that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action
with respect to the Commerce Clause
element."
Moving on to whether the penalty attached
to the health insurance mandate is a valid
use of Congress's legislative powers, the
judge noted that the Administration had
"appeared to concede" that if the mandate
was beyond Congress's constitutional
powers, then the penalty attached to failure
to obtain isnurance would necessarily fail.
The bottom line: the judtge denied the
Justice Department motion to dismiss the
case.
In one of the specific legal issues that the
judge said will have to be examined as the
case moves forward is whether, in deciding
whether the state's Tenth Amendment rights
have been violated, a 1945 federal law
reserves to the states the authority to
regulate the business of insurance. The
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 says that
states have that authority unless Congress
specifically says they do not. The Justice
Department has argued that Congress has
taken over this authority, so states must
yield, by preempting the regulation of a
health mandate. "The demarcation between
state and federal responisibility in this area,"
Hudson said, "will require further
development in future proceedings."
"Two Cheers for Federal Court's Virginia
Health Care Suit Decision"
The Washington Examiner
August 5, 2010
Ilya Somin
Monday's federal district court decision
refusing to dismiss a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of the Obama health care
plan is an important step forward for
opponents of the plan.
The suit by the state of Virginia focuses
primarily on a challenge to the "individual
mandate" element of the plan, which
requires most American citizens and legal
residents to purchase a government-
approved health insurance plan by 2014 or
pay a fine for noncompliance. A similar suit
has been filed by 20 other state governments
and the National Federation of Independent
Business in a federal court in Florida.
Judge Henry Hudson wrote that the
individual mandate "literally forges new
ground and extends Commerce Clause
powers beyond its current high watermark."
As he put it, "No reported case from any
federal appellate court has" ruled that
Congress has the power to "regulate a
person's decision not to purchase a
product." This undercuts the federal
government's argument that the individual
mandate is clearly permitted under existing
precedent.
The federal government claims that
Congress has the power to impose it under
the Commerce Clause, the Tax Clause, and
the Necessary and Proper Clause. All three
arguments have serious flaws.
The Commerce Clause gives Congress
authority to regulate "Commerce ... among
the several states." But the individual
mandate regulates that which is neither
commercial nor interstate. A combination of
state and federal law makes it illegal to
purchase health insurance across state lines.
At most, what we have here is commerce
within a single state, not interstate
commerce.
Moreover, the object of the mandate isn't
even commerce at all. Instead of regulating
preexisting commerce, the bill forces people
to engage in commercial transactions even if
they had no previous involvement in
interstate commerce in health insurance at
all.
A series of deeply flawed Supreme Court
decisions have expanded Congress'
Commerce Clause authority well beyond
what the text of the Constitution permits.
These cases allow the federal government to
regulate almost any "economic activity."
But, as Judge Hudson points out, even they
do not give Congress the power to regulate
mere inactivity-in this case, the simple fact
of being a U.S. resident without health
insurance.
The Tax Clause gives Congress the power to
impose taxes to "pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States." The
government argues that the mandate counts
as a "tax" because it imposes a financial
penalty.
This ignores the obvious distinction between
a tax and a financial penalty for refusing to
comply with a regulation. Last September,
President Obama himself made the common
sense point that "for us to say that you've
got to take a responsibility to get health
insurance is absolutely not a tax increase."
He was right. If the government's argument
is accepted by courts, Congress could
require Americans to do almost anything on
pain of having to pay a fine if they refuse.
Finally, the federal government argues that
the mandate is authorized by the Necessary
and Proper Clause, which gives Congress
the power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution" other powers Congress is
granted by the Constitution.
But even if the mandate were "necessary,"
which is far from certain, it is not "proper"
under our constitutional system of limited
federal authority. If the clause allows
Congress to adopt the individual mandate,
the same logic would justify almost any
other requirement Congress might impose
on individuals, thereby gutting the idea of
limited federal power.
This ruling does not conclusively decide the
case in Virginia's favor. It merely denies the
federal government's motion to dismiss the
suit on the grounds that the state's
arguments are too weak to justify a full-
scale consideration of the merits. The legal
battle over the Obama health care plan is far
from over.
Nonetheless, Hudson's ruling is a victory for
those who believe that the individual
mandate is unconstitutional. It makes it
difficult to argue that the lawsuits against
the mandate are mere political
grandstanding with no basis in serious legal
argument.
GAY RIGHTS
"Judge Topples U.S. Rejection
of Gay Unions"
The New York Times
July 8, 2010
Abby Goodnough & John Schwartz
A federal judge in Massachusetts found
Thursday that a law barring the federal
government from recognizing same-sex
marriage is unconstitutional, ruling that gay
and lesbian couples deserve the same federal
benefits as heterosexual couples.
Judge Joseph L. Tauro of United States
District Court in Boston sided with the
plaintiffs in two separate cases brought by
the state attorney general and a gay rights
group.
Although legal experts disagreed over how
the rulings would fare on appeal, the judge's
decisions were nonetheless sure to further
inflame the nationwide debate over same-
sex marriage and gay rights.
If the rulings find their way to the Supreme
Court and are upheld there, they will put
same-sex marriage within the constitutional
realm of protection, just as interracial
marriage has been for decades. Seeking that
protection is at the heart of both the
Massachusetts cases and a federal case
pending in California over the legality of
that state's ban on same-sex marriage.
Tracy Schmaler, a spokeswoman for the
Justice Department, said federal officials
were reviewing the decision and had no
further comment. But lawyers for the
plaintiffs said they fully expected the Obama
administration to appeal. An appeal would
be heard by the First Circuit, which also
includes Rhode Island, Maine, New
Hampshire and Puerto Rico.
In the case brought by Attorney General
Martha Coakley, Judge Tauro found that the
1996 law, known as the Defense of Marriage
Act, or DOMA, compels Massachusetts to
discriminate against its own citizens in order
to receive federal money for certain
programs.
The other case, brought by Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders, focused more
narrowly on equal protection as applied to a
handful of federal benefits. In that case,
Judge Tauro agreed that the federal law
violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution by denying benefits to one class
of married couples-gay men and
lesbians-but not others.
Neither suit challenged a separate provision
of the Defense of Marriage Act that says
states do not have to recognize same-sex
marriages performed in other states. But if
the cases make their way to the Supreme
Court and are upheld, gay and lesbian
couples in states that recognize same-sex
marriage will be eligible for federal benefits
that are now granted only to heterosexual
married couples.
"This court has determined that it is clearly
within the authority of the commonwealth to
recognize same-sex marriages among its
residents, and to afford those individuals in
same-sex marriages any benefits, rights and
privileges to which they are entitled by
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virtue of their marital status," Judge Tauro
wrote in the case brought by Ms. Coakley.
"The federal government, by enacting and
enforcing DOMA, plainly encroaches upon
the firmly entrenched province of the state."
Proponents of gay rights embraced the
rulings as legal victories.
"Today the court simply affirmed that our
country won't tolerate second-class
marriages," said Mary Bonauto, civil rights
project director for Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders, who argued the
case. "This ruling will make a real
difference for countless families in
Massachusetts."
Chris Gacek, a senior fellow at the Family
Research Council, a leading conservative
group, said he was disappointed by the
decision.
"The idea that a court can say that this
definition of marriage that's been around
forever is irrational is mind-boggling," Mr.
Gacek said. "It's a bad decision."
Massachusetts has allowed same-sex
couples to marry since 2004, and while more
than 15,000 have done so, they are denied
federal benefits like Social Security
survivors' payments, the right to file taxes
jointly and guaranteed leave from work to
care for a sick spouse.
In the Coakley case, the judge held that
federal restrictions on funding for states that
recognize same-sex marriage violates the
10th Amendment, the part of the
Constitution that declares that rights not
explicitly granted to the federal government,
or denied to the states, belong to the states.
The Obama administration's Justice
Department was in the position of defending
the Defense of Marriage Act even though
Barack Obama had called during the 2008
presidential campaign for repealing it. Scott
Simpson, when arguing the case on behalf of
the government in May, opened by
acknowledging the administration's
opposition to the act, but saying he was still
obliged to defend its constitutionality.
"This presidential administration disagrees
with DOMA as a matter of policy," Mr.
Simpson said at the time. "But that does not
affect its constitutionality."
Some constitutional scholars said they were
surprised by Judge Tauro's opinions in the
two cases.
"What an amazing set of opinions," said
Jack M. Balkin, a professor at Yale Law
School. "No chance they'll be held up on
appeal."
Professor Balkin, who supports the right to
same-sex marriage, said the opinions
ignored the federal government's
longstanding involvement in marriage issues
in areas like welfare, tax policy, health care,
Social Security and more. The opinion in the
advocacy group's case applies the
Constitution to marriage rights, he said,
undercutting the notion that the marriage is
not a federal concern.
"These two opinions are at war with
themselves," he said.
The arguments concerning the 10th
Amendment and the spending clause, if
upheld, would "take down a wide swath of
programs-you can't even list the number of
programs that would be affected," he said.
By citing the 10th Amendment and making
what is essentially a states' rights argument,
Professor Balkin said Judge Tauro was
"attempting to hoist conservatives by their
own petard, by saying: 'You like the 10th
Amendment? I'll give you the 10th
Amendment! I'll strike down DOMA! '
Erwin Chemerinsky, the dean of the
University of California, Irvine, School of
Law, was more supportive of the logic of the
two opinions, and said they worked together
to establish a broad right of marriage for
same-sex couples.
"The key issue in this case, and in all
litigation about marriage equality for gays
and lesbians, is, Does the government have a
rational basis for treating same-sex couples
differently from heterosexual couples?" he
said. "Here, the court says there is no
rational basis for treating same-sex couples
differently from heterosexual couples.
Therefore, DOMA is unconstitutional, and
conditioning federal funding on compliance
with DOMA is unconstitutional."
A central issue in the fight over the
constitutionality of California's same-sex
marriage ban is whether laws restricting gay
rights should be held to a tougher standard
of review than the "rational basis" test, and
so Judge Tauro's decision takes a different
path that would eliminate the need for that
line of argument, Professor Chemerinsky
said.
"There's no need to get to higher scrutiny if
it fails rational basis review," he said.
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"Be Careful What You Wish For Department:
Federal District Court Strikes Down DOMA"
Balkinization
July 8, 2010
Jack Balkin
Today Judge Joseph Tauro in the federal
district court in Massachusetts struck down
section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) in two opinions, Gill v. Office of
Personnel Management, and Massachusetts
v. HHS. Section 3 of DOMA requires that
marriage, for purposes of federal benefits
programs, must be defined as the union of
one man and one woman, so that same sex
marriages cannot take advantage of any
federal benefits programs. Gill holds that
this violates the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment because there is no
rational basis for denying same sex couples
already recognized in a particular state from
receiving federal benefits. Massachusetts v.
HHS holds that federal programs that deny
benefits to married same sex couples violate
the Tenth Amendment because they intrude
into a function exclusively reserved to
states, namely the definition and regulation
of marriage. It also holds that selective
funding of only opposite sex couples is not
within the federal spending power under the
General Welfare Clause because it places an
unconstitutional condition on the receipt of
federal funds.
I am a strong supporter of same sex
marriage. Nevertheless, I predict that both of
these opinions will be overturned on appeal.
Whether one likes it or not-and I do not-
Judge Tauro is way ahead of the national
consensus on the the equal protection issue.
I personally think that discrimination against
gays and lesbians is irrational, but a federal
district court judge-who must obey
existing precedents, and who is overseen by
a federal judiciary and a Supreme Court
constituted as they currently are-is in a
very different position than I am.
Perhaps more importantly, his Tenth
Amendment arguments prove entirely too
much. As much as liberals might applaud
the result, they should be aware that the
logic of his arguments, taken seriously,
would undermine the constitutionality of
wide swaths of federal regulatory programs
and seriously constrict federal regulatory
power.
To be sure, there is something delightfully
playful and perverse about the two opinions
when you read them. Judge Tauro uses the
Tenth Amendment-much beloved by
conservatives-to strike down another law
much beloved by conservatives-DOMA.
There is a kind of clever, "gotcha" element
to this logic. It is as if he's saying: "You
want the Tenth Amendment? I'll give you
the Tenth Amendment!" But in the long run,
this sort of argument, clever as it is, is not
going to work. Much as I applaud the
cleverness-which is certain to twist both
liberal and conservative commentators in
knots-I do not support the logic.
The arguments of Judge Tauro's two
opinions are at war with each other. He
wants to say that marriage is a distinctly
state law function with which the federal
government may not interfere. But the
federal government has been involved in the
regulation of family life and family
formation since at least Reconstruction, and
especially so since the New Deal. Much of
the modem welfare state and tax code
defines families, regulates family formation
and gives incentives (some good and some
bad) with respect to marriages and families.
Indeed, social conservatives have often
argued for using the federal government's
taxing and spending powers to create certain
types of incentives for family formation and
to benefit certain types of family structures;
so too have liberals.
In both opinions, Judge Tauro takes us
through a list of federal programs for which
same sex couples are denied benefits. But he
does not see that even as he does so, he is
also reciting the history of federal
involvement in family formation and family
structure. His Tenth Amendment argument
therefore collapses of its own weight. If the
federal government cannot interfere with
state prerogatives in these areas, why was it
able to pass all of these statutes, which
clearly affect how state family law operates
in practice and clearly give incentives that
could further, undermine, or even in some
cases preempt state policies?
(In one of the wildest parts of the
Massachusetts v. HHS opinion, Judge Tauro
resurrects Chief Justice Rehnquist's
"traditional governmental functions"
approach from National League of Cities v.
Usery, which was specifically overturned in
1985 in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transportation Company on the grounds
that it was completely unworkable. The
existence of Supreme Court authority,
however, does not stop Judge Tauro; he
simply notes that a First Circuit decision
predating Garcia that used the concept to
uphold the federal child support recovery
law is still on the books, and who knows,
maybe the Supreme Court will change its
mind!)
Moreover, while insisting that marriage is a
distinctly state prerogative, Judge Tauro
argues that the federal constitution makes it
irrational for the federal government to
discriminate between same and opposite sex
couples. But if so then it follows that it
would also be irrational for a state
government to discriminate, because the test
under the Fifth Amendment equal protection
component and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
(which applies to the states) is the same.
Thus Judge Tauro is saying that marriage is
none of the federal government's business,
except, of course, when a federal court
thinks otherwise. He is, in essence, laying
the groundwork for an equal protection
challenge to state marriage laws in virtually
every state. This is not a result that is
particularly respectful of state prerogatives!
Finally, Judge Tauro's attempt to limit
federal power through the Tenth
Amendment so that it does not interfere with
state prerogatives might delight members of
the contemporary Tea Party movement (at
least if it wasn't aimed at DOMA), but it
should give most Americans pause. The
modern state depends heavily on the federal
government's taxing and spending powers
for many of the benefits that citizens hold
dear, including Medicare, Medicaid, Social
Security, and the newly passed provisions of
the Affordable Care Act. These programs
have regulatory effects on state family
policies just as much as DOMA does. If
DOMA's direct interference with state
prerogatives is beyond federal power, then
perhaps any or all of these programs are
vulnerable-and unconstitutional-to the
extent they interfere with state policies
regarding family formation as well. Put
differently, Judge Tauro has offered a road
map to attack a wide range of federal
welfare programs, including health care
reform. No matter how much they might like
the result in this particular case, this is not a
road that liberals want to travel.
There is much to admire in Judge Tauro's
bravery in writing these opinions, and in his
forthright declaration that the federal
government's policy is unjust and
unreasonable. His two opinions are wild,
audacious, and fearless in their logic. But for
the same reason, they will and should be
quickly overturned. I believe that the civil
rights of gays and lesbians will someday be
vindicated by legislatures and courts. But
not in this way.
"Defense of Marriage Act's
Achilles Heel"
Los Angeles Times
July 14, 2010
Andrew Koppelman
Last week, a federal court in Massachusetts
held unconstitutional the provision of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act, known as
DOMA, that denies federal benefits to same-
sex spouses. The ruling relied on two
arguments: that the law interfered with the
rights of states guaranteed in the 10th
Amendment, and that it violated the
Constitution's equal protection clause. The
first of these arguments doesn't make much
sense, but the second is so strong that it has
a good chance of being accepted by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Section 3 of DOMA requires that marriage,
for all federal purposes, be defined as the
union of one man and one woman. It was
challenged by the attorney general in
Massachusetts, where same-sex marriage is
legal, and also in a separate suit by seven
married same-sex couples and three
widowers in the state who had been in same-
sex marriages. The plaintiffs include the
surviving spouse of Rep. Gerry Studds (D-
Mass.), the first openly gay man to serve in
Congress. After Studds' death, his spouse
was denied both health insurance and the
normal survivor annuity-the only widower
of a member of Congress to be refused these
benefits.
In the case brought by Massachusetts, the
court held that DOMA intrudes on
"traditional government functions,"
specifically the state's right to define what
marriage is. In the individuals' cases, it held
that there is no rational basis for denying
federal benefits to same-sex spouses in
marriages legally recognized in their states.
The first of these arguments is silly, and
potentially mischievous. But the second is
very strong, and can and should carry the
day if, as is likely, the case is appealed all
the way to the Supreme Court.
The trouble with the states' rights argument
is its implication that whenever a federal law
uses the word "marriage" to define the scope
of some federal program, it is obligated to
follow state law. But an obvious
counterexample exists: immigration. In most
states, the government doesn't involve itself
in the reasons a couple marries, even if
there's no love involved and the marriage is
primarily a business transaction or a matter
of convenience. But when people marry for
immigration purposes, the federal
government has no trouble deeming the
marriage "fraudulent," even though it
remains valid under state law. The
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
agency doesn't interfere with traditional
state functions because it leaves the state
free to recognize, for its own purposes, any
marriage it likes. But it won't grant legal
residency to immigrants it believes married
only to secure the benefit.
The other part of the court's ruling,
however, held that DOMA lacked a rational
basis because none of the government's
justifications for the law's blanket
discrimination made sense. It's hard to see,
for example, how the law would protect
traditional marriage. Are same-sex couples
going to be discouraged from marrying
because they wouldn't be entitled to be
buried together in a veterans cemetery? Not
likely. This irrationality, and the
unprecedented burden it imposes-no class
of state-recognized marriages has ever
before in American history been subjected to
this kind of federal discrimination-led the
court to infer an unconstitutional purpose: a
bare desire to harm a politically unpopular
group.
The case will probably be appealed. But will
it be upheld? This Supreme Court is unlikely
to conclude that same-sex marriage must be
allowed in all states. But you can invalidate
DOMA without going that far, by focusing
on its unprecedented, blunderbuss character.
On the current Supreme Court, this case
would probably depend on the swing vote of
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. (If he is still
there when it is heard-appeals take years,
and he turns 74 later this month.) In a 1996
decision striking down a Colorado law that
repealed all antidiscrimination protection for
gay people, he noted that it "has the peculiar
property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named
group." This kind of imposition "is
unprecedented in our jurisprudence," and he
declared that it "is not within our
constitutional tradition to enact laws of this
sort." Similarly, in a 2003 decision
invalidating a law banning homosexual sex,
he observed that such gay-specific laws
were very recent, originating in the 1970s.
That same logic might well condemn
DOMA, but it would be unlikely to
invalidate the marriage laws of individual
states.
Even the states' rights argument could be
rehabilitated if, on appeal, Massachusetts
focuses on the equality argument. The
district court ruled in favor of the state for
two independent reasons, only one of which
relied on inherent state functions. The other,
better argument was that a state can't be
required to violate the Constitution in order
to get federal funds. If DOMA is
unconstitutional because of the way it
singles out gay people to beat up on, then
states can't be denied federal funds when
they refuse to administer it. For example, if
DOMA's requirement that same-sex couples
be excluded from veterans cemeteries is
unconstitutional, then Massachusetts can't
lose its federal funding when it buries a
same-sex couple in a state-administered
veterans cemetery.
There's a lesson here for lawyers. There is a
temptation in litigation to make every
argument you can possibly think of, hoping
that something will persuade the judge.
Here, though, that strategy has backfired:
The judge bought both arguments, the bad
one as well as the good one, and so his
opinion ended up looking weaker than it
really is.
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"Ruling Against Prop. 8 Could Lead to Federal
Precedent on Gay Marriage"
Los Angeles Times
August 4, 2010
Maura Dolan & Carol J. Williams
A federal judge declared California's ban on
same-sex marriage unconstitutional
Wednesday, saying that no legitimate state
interest justified treating gay and lesbian
couples differently from others and that
"moral disapproval" was not enough to save
the voter-passed Proposition 8.
California "has no interest in differentiating
between same-sex and opposite-sex unions,"
U.S. District Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker
said in his 136-page ruling.
The ruling was the first in the country to
strike down a marriage ban on federal
constitutional grounds. Previous cases have
cited state constitutions.
Lawyers on both sides expect the ruling to
be appealed and ultimately reach the U.S.
Supreme Court during the next few years.
It is unclear whether California will conduct
any same-sex weddings during that time.
Walker stayed his ruling at least until
Friday, when he will hold another hearing.
In striking down Proposition 8, Walker said
the ban violated the federal constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and of due
process.
Previous court decisions have established
that the ability to marry is a fundamental
right that cannot be denied to people without
a compelling rationale, Walker said.
Proposition 8 violated that right and
discriminated on the basis of both sex and
sexual orientation in violation of the equal
protection clause, he ruled.
The jurist, a Republican appointee who is
gay, cited extensive evidence from the trial
to support his finding that there was not a
rational basis for excluding gays and
lesbians from marriage. In particular, he
rejected the argument advanced by
supporters of Proposition 8 that children of
opposite-sex couples fare better than
children of same-sex couples, saying that
expert testimony in the trial provided no
support for that argument.
"The evidence shows conclusively that
moral and religious views form the only
basis for a belief that same-sex couples are
different from opposite-sex couples,"
Walker wrote.
Andy Pugno, a lawyer for the backers of the
ballot measure, said he believed Walker
would be overturned on appeal.
Walker's "invalidation of the votes of over 7
million Californians violates binding legal
precedent and short-circuits the democratic
process," Pugno said.
He called it "disturbing that the trial court,
in order to strike down Prop. 8, has literally
accused the majority of California voters of
having ill and discriminatory intent when
casting their votes for Prop. 8."
At least some legal experts said his lengthy
recitation of the testimony could bolster his
ruling during the appeals to come. Higher
courts generally defer to trial judges' rulings
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on factual questions that stem from a trial,
although they still could determine that he
was wrong on the law.
John Eastman, a conservative scholar who
supported Proposition 8, said Walker's
analysis and detailed references to trial
evidence were likely to persuade U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, a swing vote on the high court, to
rule in favor of same-sex marriage.
"I think Justice Kennedy is going to side
with Judge Walker," said the former dean of
Chapman University law school.
Barry McDonald, a constitutional law
professor at Pepperdine University, said
Walker's findings that homosexuality is a
biological status instead of a voluntary
choice, that children don't suffer harm when
raised by same-sex couples and that
Proposition 8 was based primarily on
irrational fear of homosexuality "are going
to make it more difficult for appellate courts
to overturn this court's ruling."
Edward E. (Ned) Dolejsi, executive director
of the California Catholic Conference, said
he believed the judge's ruling was both
legally and morally wrong.
"All public law and public policy is
developed from some moral perspective, the
morality that society judges is important,"
he said. To say that society shouldn't base
its laws on moral views is "hard to even
comprehend," he said.
In his decision, Walker said the evidence
showed that "domestic partnerships exist
solely to differentiate same-sex unions from
marriage" and that marriage is "culturally
superior."
He called the exclusion of same-couples
from marriage "an artifact of a time when
the genders were seen as having distinct
roles in society and marriage."
"That time has passed," he wrote.
Although sexual orientation deserves the
constitutional protection given to race and
gender, Proposition 8 would be
unconstitutional even if gays and lesbians
were afforded a lesser status, Walker said.
His ruling stressed that there was no rational
justification for banning gays from marriage.
To win a permanent stay pending appeal,
Proposition 8 proponents must show that
they are likely to prevail in the long run and
that there would be irreparable harm if the
ban is not enforced.
Lawyers for the two couples who challenged
Proposition 8 said they were confident that
higher courts would uphold Walker's ruling.
"We will fight hard so that the constitutional
rights vindicated by the 138-page, very
careful, thoughtful, analytical opinion by
this judge will be brought into fruition as
soon as possible," pledged Ted Olson, one
of the lawyers in the case.
Other gay rights lawyers predicted that the
ruling would change the tenor of the legal
debate in the courts.
"This is a tour de force-a grand slam on
every count," said Shannon Price Minter,
legal director for the National Center for
Lesbian Rights. "This is without a doubt a
game-changing ruling."
Wednesday's ruling stemmed from a lawsuit
filed last year by two homosexual couples
who argued that the marriage ban violates
their federal constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process.
The suit was the brainchild of a gay political
strategist in Los Angeles who formed a
nonprofit to finance the litigation.
The group hired two legal luminaries from
opposite sides of the political spectrum to
try to overturn the ballot measure. Former
U.S. Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson, a
conservative icon, signed on with litigator
David Boies, a liberal who squared off
against Olson in Bush vs. Gore, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling that gave George W.
Bush the presidency in 2000.
Gay-rights groups had opposed the lawsuit,
fearful that the U.S. Supreme Court might
rule against marriage rights and create a
precedent that could take decades to
overturn.
But after the suit was filed, gay rights
lawyers flocked to support it, filing friend-
of-court arguments on why Proposition 8
should be overturned.
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and Atty.
Gen. Jerry Brown refused to defend the
marriage ban, leaving the sponsors of the
initiative to fill the vacuum. They hired a
team of lawyers experienced in U.S.
Supreme Court litigation.
Proposition 8 passed with a 52.3% vote six
months after the California Supreme Court
ruled that same-sex marriage was permitted
under the state Constitution.
At trial, the opponents of Prop. 8 presented
witnesses who cited studies that showed
children reared from birth by gay and
lesbian couples do as well as children born
into opposite-sex families. They also
testified that the clamor for marriage in the
gay community had given the institution of
marriage greater esteem.
The trial appeared to be a lopsided show for
the challengers, who called 16 witnesses,
including researchers from the nation's top
universities, and presented tearful testimony
from gays and lesbians about why marriage
mattered to them.
The backers of Proposition 8 called only two
witnesses, and both made concessions under
cross-examination that helped the other side.
The sponsors complained that Walker's
pretrial rulings had been unfair and that
some of their prospective witnesses decided
not to testify out of fear for their safety.
When Walker ruled that he would broadcast
portions of the trial on the Internet,
Proposition 8 proponents fought him all the
way to the U.S. Supreme Court and won a 5-
4 ruling barring cameras in the courtroom.
The trial nevertheless was widely covered,
with some groups doing minute-by-minute
blogging. Law professors brought their
students to watch the top-notch legal theater.
An estimated 18,000 same-sex couples
married in California during the months it
was legal, and the state continues to
recognize those marriages.
"A Brilliant Ruling: Judge Walker's Decision
to Overturn Prop 8 is Factual,
Well-Reasoned, and Powerful"
Slate
August 14, 2010
Dahlia Lithwick
Judge Vaughn R. Walker is not Anthony
Kennedy. But when the chips are down, he
certainly knows how to write like him. I
count-in his opinion today-seven
citations to Justice Kennedy's 1996 opinion
in Romer v. Evans (striking down an anti-
gay Colorado ballot initiative) and eight
citations to his 2003 decision in Lawrence v.
Texas (striking down Texas' gay-sodomy
law). In a stunning decision this afternoon,
finding California's Proposition 8 ballot
initiative banning gay marriage
unconstitutional, Walker trod heavily on the
path Kennedy has blazed on gay rights: "[I]t
would demean a married couple were it to
be said marriage is simply about the right to
have sexual intercourse," quotes Walker.
"'[M]oral disapproval, without any other
asserted state interest,' has never been a
rational basis for legislation," cites Walker.
"Animus towards gays and lesbians or
simply a belief that a relationship between a
man and a woman is inherently better than a
relationship between two men or two
women, this belief is not a proper basis on
which to legislate," Walker notes, with a
jerk of the thumb at Kennedy.
Justice Kennedy? Hot sauce to go with those
words?
But for all the lofty language about freedom
and morality, nobody can fairly accuse
Judge Walker of putting together an
insubstantial or unsubstantiated opinion
today. Indeed, the whole point of this legal
exercise-the lengthy trial, the spectacularly
detailed finding of facts (80 of them! with
subheadings!)-was to pit expert against
expert, science against science, and fact
against prejudice.
It's hard to read Judge Walker's opinion
without sensing that what really won out
today was science, methodology, and hard
work. Had the proponents of Prop 8 made
even a minimal effort to put on a case, to
track down real experts, to do more than try
to assert their way to legal victory, this
would have been a closer case. But faced
with one team that mounted a serious effort
and another team that did little more than
fire up their big, gay boogeyman
screensaver for two straight weeks, it wasn't
much of a fight. Judge Walker scolds them
at the outset for promising in their trial brief
to prove that same-sex marriage would
"effect some twenty-three harmful
consequences" and then putting on almost
no case.
Walker notes that the plaintiffs presented
eight lay witnesses and nine expert
witnesses, including historians, economists,
psychologists, and a political scientist.
Walker lays out their testimony in detail.
Then he turns to the proponents' tactical
decision to withdraw several of their
witnesses, claiming "extreme concern about
their personal safety" and unwillingness to
testify if there were to be "recording of any
sort." Even when it was determined that
there would be no recording, counsel
declined to call them. They were left with
two trial witnesses, one of whom, David
Blankenhorn, founder and president of the
Institute for American Values, the judge
found "lacks the qualifications to offer
opinion testimony and, in any event, failed
to provide cogent testimony in support of
proponent's factual assertions."
Blankenhorn's credentials, methodology,
lack of peer-reviewed studies, and general
shiftiness on cross examination didn't
impress Walker. And once he was done with
Blankenhorn, he turned to the only other
witness-Kenneth P. Miller-who testified
only to the limited question of the plaintiffs'
political power. Walker wasn't much more
impressed by Miller, giving his opinions
"little weight."
Then come the elaborate "findings of
fact"-and recall that appellate courts must
defer far more to a judge's findings of fact
than conclusions of law. Here is where
Judge Walker knits together the trial
evidence, to the data, to the nerves at the
very base of Justice Kennedy's brain.
Among his most notable determinations of
fact, Walker fimds: states have long
discriminated in matters of who can marry;
marital status affects immigration,
citizenship, tax policy, property and
inheritance rules, and benefits programs;
that individuals do not choose their own
sexual orientation; California law
encourages gay couples to become parents;
domestic partnership is a second-class legal
status; permitting same-sex couples to marry
does not affect the number of opposite-sex
couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, or
otherwise screw around. He found that it
benefits the children of gay parents to have
them be married and that the gender of a
child's parent is not a factor in a child's
adjustment. He found that Prop 8 puts the
force of law behind a social stigma and that
the entirety of the Prop 8 campaign relied on
instilling fears that children exposed to the
concept of same-sex marriage may become
gay. (Brand-new data show that the needle
only really moved in favor of the Prop 8
camp when parents of young children came
out in force against gay marriage in the 11 th
hour of the campaign.) He found that
stereotypes targeting gays and lesbians have
resulted in terrible disadvantages for them
and that the Prop 8 campaign traded on
those stereotypes.
And then Walker turned to his conclusions
of law, finding that under both the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses:
Proposition 8 fails to advance any
rational basis in singling out gay men
and lesbians for denial of a marriage
license. Indeed, the evidence shows
Proposition 8 does nothing more
than enshrine in the California
Constitution the notion that opposite-
sex couples are superior to same-sex
couples. Because California has no
interest in discriminating against gay
men and lesbians, and because
Proposition 8 prevents California
from fulfilling its constitutional
obligation to provide marriages on
an equal basis, the court concludes
that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional.
Is that the end of it? Oh, no. Judge Walker is
already being flayed alive for the breadth
and boldness of his decision. The appeals
road will be long and nasty. Walker has
temporarily stayed the ruling pending
argument on a stay. (Rick Hasen argues it
may be wise for him to stay the order
pending appeal for tactical reasons.) Any
way you look at it, today's decision was
written for a court of one-Kennedy-the
man who has written most eloquently about
dignity and freedom and the right to
determine one's own humanity. The real
triumph of Perry v. Schwarzenegger may be
that it talks in the very loftiest terms about
matters rooted in logic, science, money,
social psychology, and fact.
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"Prop. 8 Judge Makes Strange Charge"
San Francisco Chronicle
August 8, 2010
Nelson Lund
A federal judge in San Francisco ruled
Wednesday that President Obama is a bigot.
And not just the president. Joe Biden as
well, and Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Sandra Day O'Connor. And maybe you, too.
The judge didn't put it that way, of course.
Technically, he ruled that an amendment to
California's Constitution violated the U.S.
Constitution by defining marriage as a union
of one man and one woman. That
amendment was approved by voters after a
state court declared that a similar statute
violated the state Constitution. The
amendment then was challenged in federal
court as a violation of the U.S. Constitution.
This was a strange ruling. The U.S. Supreme
Court decided in 1971 that an identical
challenge to the traditional definition of
marriage was menitless. Nor has the
Supreme Court ever suggested that its 1971
decision was wrong. Wednesday's ruling
relied primarily on a constitutional doctrine
that forbids laws having no conceivable
rational purpose or no purpose except to
oppress a politically unpopular minority
group. After a lengthy trial, the judge found
that the people of California must have
adopted the traditional definition of
marriage because of moral or religious
contempt for homosexuals and their
relationships.
It was a strange charge to make against the
people of California. California has the most
progressive domestic partnership law in the
nation, which gives same-sex couples all the
same substantive rights and privileges
available to married couples. Why would the
judge think that the only possible reason for
favoring the traditional definition of
marriage was bigotry? He reasoned that
every other possible explanation for the
voters' decision was so ridiculous that only
anti-gay feelings were left.
Until very recently, same-sex marriage was
unknown in human history, and it is opposed
today by many progressive leaders, like
Obama and Clinton. Can this be explained
only by irrational prejudice or religious
zeal? No. Only unions between men and
women are capable of producing offspring,
and every civilization has recognized that
responsible procreation is critical to its
survival. After the desire for self-
preservation, sexual passion is probably the
most powerful drive in human nature.
Heterosexual intercourse naturally produces
children, sometimes unintentionally and
only after nine months.
Without marriage, men often would be
uncertain about paternity or indifferent to it.
If left unchecked, many men would have
little incentive to invest in the rearing of
their offspring, and the ensuing
irresponsibility would have made the
development of civilization impossible.
The fundamental purpose of marriage is to
encourage biological parents, especially
fathers, to take responsibility for their
children. Because this institution responds to
a phenomenon uniquely created by
heterosexual intercourse, the meaning of
marriage has always been inseparable from
the problem it addresses.
Homosexual relationships (and lots of others
as well), have nothing to do with the
purpose of marriage, which is why marriage
does not extend to them. Constitutional
doctrine requires only one conceivable
rational reason for a law, and the traditional
definition of marriage easily meets that test.
The judge in this case thinks it was proved
at trial that same-sex marriage will not
amount to a sweeping social change. He
thinks it is "beyond debate" that same-sex
marriages will have no detrimental effects
on the institution of marriage. Can anyone
really believe that such things can be proved
by witnesses in a courtroom?
Recently, a few states have begun to
experiment with same-sex marriage. Maybe
this will work out well, and the more
cautious states eventually will catch up. But
some experiments fail. Our democracy
allows different states to change their
marriage laws and to abandon experiments
that don't succeed. But if this judge's ruling
is upheld on appeal, that will be that, and
every state will be forced to conform, for
good or ill.
Fortunately, Wednesday's decision is far
from final. The judge's ruling will have no
legal effect on any other cases. Even his
ruling in this case might not (and should not)
go into effect unless it is upheld on appeal.
The judge's conduct during this case has
already triggered rebukes from higher
courts, and they are not likely to accept his
bizarre conclusion that the traditional
definition of marriage is the product of mass
bigotry. So if you agree with Obama about
preserving the traditional definition, you
haven't yet been convicted of a moral crime.
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